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vented which provide added comfort or safety . . . . During these
years, too, there has come a general recognition that dwellings which
are unsafe or unsanitary or which fail to provide the amenities essential to decent living may work injury not only to those who live
there, but to the general welfare.
In light of modem conditions, Florida courts should adopt this philosophy rather than rely on the "good old days," during which there existed
neither modem problems nor modem conveniences.
THOMAS E. MoRRs

INSURANCE: STRICT LIABILITY FOR INSURANCE
COMPANIES IN EXCESS JUDGMENT SUITS
National Indemnity Co. v. Donald, 229 So. 2d 900 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969)
In a prior suit by plaintiff, appellee had suffered a judgment for wrongful death in the amount of 110,000 dollars. National Indemnity, appellee's
insurer, paid 100,000 dollars, the amount of insured's policy. The insured
sued the company for the excess, alleging the insurer's negligence and bad
faith in refusing an offer to settle within the policy limits. The trial court
found for appellee on the basis of National Indemnity's bad faith. On appeal,
the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Judge Reed dissenting, affirmed without
opinion.'
The policy issued by National Indemnity had reserved to the insurer
the right to control any litigation involving the insured and to negotiate
settlements at its discretion. 2 Early cases held that such a reservation did

not grant to the insured a right to sue the insurer for excess judgments
rendered after the latter had refused to settle within policy limits.3 After
1900, however, some courts began holding insurers liable for excess judg1.

229 So. 2d 900 (4th D.CA. Fla. 1969).

2. This provision is usually found in policies insuring against tort liability. Tully v.
Travelers' Ins. Co., 118 F. Supp. 568, 569 (N.D. Fla. 1954).
3. E.g., Rumford Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 92 Me. 574, 43 A. 503 (1899);
Schmidt & Sons Brewing Co. v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 244 Pa. 286, 90 A. 653 (1914).
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ments4 on grounds either of bad faith5 or negligence. 6 A few courts confused
the rationale for these decisions by using these concepts interchangeably 7
The Florida supreme court initially considered the excess judgment
issue in Auto Mutual Indemnity Co. v. Shaw.8 Apparently relying on both
the bad faith and negligence tests, the court held the insurer liable for an
excess judgment. 9 This decision resulted in uncertainty concerning which
test was applicable in Florida.1 0 In a case arising in Florida, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals indicated that Florida courts based liability on the bad
faith rule, thus interpreting Florida law as consistent with the weight of
authority.'. Subsequently, a Florida appellate court expressly adopted the
bad faith rationale.12
Unlike some jurisdictions, 13 Florida has not established a uniform
definition of bad faith in situations involving excess judgments, but some
criteria concerning bad faith have emerged from the decided cases. In
deciding whether to accept a settlement offer, the insurer must consider
equally the interest of the insured with its own interest.14 The insured
4. E.g., Anderson v. Southern Sur. Co., 107 Kan. 375, 191 P. 583 (1920); Wynnwood
Lumber Co. v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 173 N.C. 269, 91 S.E. 946 (1917). See also Attleboro Mfg.
Co. v. Frankfort Marine Accident & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 171 F. 495 (D. Mass. 1909), in
which recovery for an excess judgment was allowed after the insurance company negligently
defended an earlier action.
5. E.g., American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 61 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1932),
cert. denied, 289 U.S. 736 (1932).

6. E.g., Ballard v. Ocean Accident & Guar. Co., 86 F.2d 449, 453 (7th Cir. 1936). See
also Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine Accident & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 171 F. 495,
500 (D. Mass. 1909).
7. J. APPLEMAN, INSURANcE LAw & PRAcrIcE §4712 (1962).
8. 134 Fla. 815, 184 So. 852 (1938).
9. "It appears that the insurance company ... should be held to that degree of care
and diligence which a man of ordinary care and prudence should exercise in the management of his own business.... The prevailing rule seems to be however that the insurer
must act in good faith toward the assured in its effort to negotiate a settlement." Id. at
830, 184 So. at 859.
10. American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Greyhound Corp., 232 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1959). In this
case a federal trial judge gave a jury instruction that closely approximated the Shaw opinion,
and when defendant objected that it confused the jury, the judge admitted: "It is confusing to me, not only to the jury." Id. at 93.
11. Id. at 94.
12. American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Davis, 146 So. 2d 615, 617 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
13. E.g., Brown v. Guaranty Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1957). The
court set out the factors determinative of bad faith: the strength of the injured claimant's
case on the issues of liability and damages; attempts by the insurer to induce the insured to
contribute to a settlement; failure of the insurer to properly investigate the circumstances
in order to ascertain the evidence against the insured; the insurer's rejection of its own
agent's advice; failure of the insurer to inform the insured of a compromise offer; the
amount of financial risk to which each party is exposed in the event of a refusal to settle;
the fault of the insured in inducing the insurer's rejection of the compromise offer by pro.
viding misleading information; and any other factors tending to establish or negate bad
faith on the part of the insurer. Id. at 689, 319 P.2d at 75.
14. American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Davis, 146 So. 2d 615, 617 (Fla. 1962), citing Auto Mut.
Indem. Co. v. Shaw, 134 Fla. 815, 830, 184 So. 852, 859 (1938): "[I]nsurer cannot escape
liability by acting upon what it considers to be for its own interest alone ...."
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should be told of compromise offers and warned that he may be held liable
for an excess judgment.
Federal courts deciding cases arising in Florida
have further suggested that it is not necessary to show either constructive or
actual fraud on the part of the insurer.16 Moreover, the investigation made
by the insurance company must be thorough enough to permit an intelligent
decision regarding the opportunities for settlement.Y1 Although federal decisions have held that Florida courts employ the bad faith test, 8 these courts
still consider the insurer's negligence in determining whether it acted in
bad faith.' 9
In the instant case, the trial court found that two facts established
bad faith. First, the insurer's counter-offer of 75,000 dollars, in response to
plaintiff's settlement offer of 90,000 dollars, was not based upon an intelligent evaluation of the claim. The insured emphasized that National Indemnity neither deposed the plaintiff nor submitted interrogatories to her before
the trial of the wrongful death action. The insured, however, failed to
prove that the company did not gather adequate information from other
sources. 20 The weight of authority holds only that enough evidence must
be gathered to permit an intelligent decision by the insurer, not that this
information must be derived from a specific source. 21 The other indication of
bad faith was that the insurer first offered 25,000 dollars to settle, then
successively 35,000, 50,000, and 75,000 dollars. 22 Until the instant case,
graduated counter-offers were not considered an element of bad faith in
Florida. 23 The two factors hardly seem sufficient proof of bad faith when
24
the elements of bad faith required by prior Florida decisions are considered.
The present decision may be at least partially explained by the hypothesis that most courts consistently favor the insured in his relationships with
the insurer. Courts have awarded attorney's fees to the insured in successful
15. See Auto Mut. Indem. Co. v. Shaw, 134 Fla. 815, 830, 184 So. 852, 859 (1938).
16. American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Greyhound Corp., 258 F.2d 709, 713 (5th Cir. 1958).
The court rejected the following jury instruction: "Bad faith cannot be imputed unless there
was something in the particular transaction equivalent to fraud, actual or constructive."
17. Id. at 716.

18. American Fid. 9&
Cas. Co. v. Greyhound Corp., 232 F.2d 89, 93 (5th Cir. 1956).
19.
& Cas.
20.
21.
22.

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 412 F.2d 475, 483 (5th Cir. 1969); American Fid.
Co. v. Greyhound Corp., 258 F.2d 709, 716 (5th Cir. 1958).
229 So. 2d 900, 903 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969) (dissenting opinion).
American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Greyhound Corp., 258 F.2d 709, 716 (5th Cir. 1958).
229 So. 2d 900, 902 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969) (dissenting opinion). The insurer had

evaluated the claim at $75,000 for settlement purposes. Id. at 903.
23. See text accompanying notes 14-19 supra.
24. Compare Auto Mut. Indem. Co. v. Shaw, 134 Fla. 815, 832, 184 So. 852, 859 (1938),
with American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Davis, 146 So. 2d 615, 617, 618 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1962).

In Shaw the court held that the mere fact an excess judgment was rendered after the insurer rejected a settlement offer within policy limits, in the face of convincing evidence of

insured's negligence, was insufficient to sustain a verdict for bad faith. The Davis court,
however, found bad faith on these substantial grounds: insurer rejected an offer within
the policy limits despite its attorney's advice to settle, the judge's announcement at the
pretrial conference that he would direct a verdict for plaintiff, and instructions from the

home office to settle.
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actions against the insurer for bad faith.25 In settling excess judgment claims
it is not necessary that the insured first pay the excess judgment in order
to have a cause of action against the insurer. 26 Moreover, the insured may
assign his cause of action for the excess judgment to the plaintiff in the
original action against him. 27 Recently, it has been held that the insurer
may be liable for punitive damages if its failure to settle within policy limits
is willful or wanton misconduct.28 The insured may also recover damages for
mental anguish caused by a wrongful refusal to settle. 29 One court has even
held that, to reject a settlement offer in good faith, the insurer may be
required to disbelieve its own insured if available evidence indicates that
he has lied.3 0 Shingleton v. Busseys' held that the plaintiff in an automobile
negligence action may join the defendant's liability insurer in his suit for
damages. A few other states have allowed this joinder through statute.3 Judicial favoritism toward the insured in the excess judgment area is
best exemplified by Crisci v. Security Insurance Co.33 The California supreme
court held the insurer liable for refusing, in bad faith, a settlement offer
within the policy limits, 34 and declared in dictum that "whenever an insurer
25. E.g., Virginia Sur. Co. v. Russ, 86 So. 2d 643, 644 (Fla. 1956).
26. E.g., Lee v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 286 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1961); American
Fire 8- Cas. Co. v. Davis, 146 So. 2d 615, 619 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1962); Gray v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 422 Pa. 500, 506, 223 A.2d 8, 9 (1966). Gray mentions three policy reasons for
this rule: (1) it prevents the insurer from benefiting from the fact that insured is impecunious and has a meritorious claim, but has insufficient funds to first pay the judgment;
(2) if payment were necessary and the insured were impecunious, insurer could
refuse to settle and thus be liable only for the amount specified by the policy; (3) entry of
judgment against insured adversely affects his credit rating.
27. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 412 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1969). This allows the impecunious defendant to satisfy the judgment by assigning his cause of action, which may be
his only asset. See also McNulty v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 221 So. 2d 208, 211 (3d
D.C.A. Fla. 1969), afl'd, 229 So. 2d 585, 587 (Fla. 1970); Gray v. Nationwide Mountain Ins.
Co., 422 Pa. 500, 508, 223 A.2d 8, 13 (1966).
28. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Smoot, 881 F.2d 881, 339 (5th Cir. 1967).
29. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 433-84, 426 P.2d 173, 179, 58 Cal. Rptr.
13, 19 (1967). See also Miholevich v. Mid-West Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 261 Mich. 495, 499, 204
N.W. 202, 208 (1938).
30. Klingman v. National Indem. Co., 317 F-2d 850, 854 (7th Cir. 1963). Contra, Hall v.
Preferred Accident Ins. Co., 204 F.2d 844, 848 (5th Cir. 1953).
31. 223 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 1969). But see Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory, 237
So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1970), which, in effect, held that absent extraordinary circumstances severance should be granted to the insurer. While the case purports to extend the Bussey
rationale to all forms of liability insurance, the result "is actually to completely reverse
the remedial aspects of Bussey." 237 So. 2d 163, 166 (1970) (Boyd, J., dissenting). The majority opinion in Beta Eta addresses itself in dicta to the instant problem: "[IThe question of
whether or not the carrier exercised good faith in the settlement of a claim against the insured could also be determined by a separate trial after the determination of the case on its
merits." 237 So. 2d 163, 165 (1970). See also Comment Civil Procedure: Judicial Creation of
Direct Action Against Automobile Liability Insurers, 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 145 (1969).
32. E.g., GA. CoDE ANN. §68-612 (1967); LA. RaV. STAT. ANN. §22:655 (1959); R.I. GEN.

LAws ANN. §27-7-1 (1956) (1968 reenactment); WIs. STAT. ANN. §260.11
33. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
34. Id. at 432, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
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receives an offer to settle within the policy limits and rejects it, the insurer
should be liable in every case for the amount of any final judgment whether
or not within the policy limits." 35

This statement suggests a strict liability

standard, which seems to have been tacitly adopted in the present case,
where the verdict was apparently based solely on the fact that an excess
judgment was rendered and not on proof of bad faith. 36 Florida may be
moving toward the theory of strict liability that was overtly urged in Crisci.
Although this development initially may seem surprising, it is actually
consistent with the judicial preference given the insured, which has placed
increased responsibility on insurance companies in dealing with their
customers.
Since it is the insurer who usually benefits from refusing a settlement
offer, strict liability seems desirable because it makes the insurer bear the
risks inherent in failing to settle.3 7 A rule of strict liability eliminates the
danger that an insurer, who is offered a settlement at or near the policy
limits, will refuse it, in effect, gambling with the policyholder's money to
further its own interests.38 Adoption of this doctrine will also end the
confusion over the bad faith and negligence standards and thus eliminate
a troublesome, or even impossible, question for the jury.39 The insurer's
defense attorney will no longer risk becoming personally liable to the insured,
nor will he be plagued with the difficult task of representing two conflicting
40
interests.
The insurance companies and others opposing strict liability offer two
major arguments against it. The first is that strict liability will encourage
purchases of low-coverage policies, under the theory that the insurance
company must bear the risk of liability over policy limits. However, buyers
of low-coverage policies assume the risk that injured plaintiffs will refuse to
make settlement offers because of the low policy limits. This would eliminate
the operation of the strict liability concept because the insurer has no offer
to reject, and therefore can take no action resulting in further liability.41
The second argument is that strict liability will cause insurance rates to rise.

35. Id. (emphasis added). The quoted material actually refers to an argument made
before the court, but in subsequent dicta the court indicated at least tacit approval of this
position.
36. See text accompanying notes 20-24 supra.
37. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 17 (1967).
38. Comment, Liability of Insurerfor Excess Judgment, 32 Am. TR AL LAw. L.J. 350, 352

(1968).
39. Appleman, Duty of Liability Insurer to Compromise Litigation, 26 Ky. L. J. 100,
109 (1937); Comment, Insurance Liability of Insurerfor judgment in Excess of Policy Limits,
48 MAic. L. Rxv. 95, 101 (1949).
40. Note, Excess Liability: Reconsideration of California's Bad Faith Negligence Rule,
18 STAN. L. REv. 475, 481, 484 (1966). In light of the court's protection of the insured "a
defense attorney can no longer with impunity advise an insurance company that although
a refusal to settle will probably subject the company to excess liability, the chances of
obtaining a favorable verdict justify the risk." Id. at 481.
41. Id. at 484.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1970

5

